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Abstract: In choosing environmental compliance levels, firms make strategic 
decisions based on their expectations about how the intensity of the scrutiny 
they face from enforcement agencies will respond to their own – and perhaps 
others’ – environmental performance. The objective of this paper is to provide 
insight into those expectations in Argentina – what they are and what 
influences them – and to interpret the results in the context of compliance 
incentives in developing economies. We report results based on a large-scale 
survey of polluting firms in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Amongst other things, we 
find that industry concentration, the social vulnerability of the surrounding 
community, and pessimistic attitudes to the general effectiveness of 
government regulations and/or about society’s commitment to the environment 
weaken expectations of compliance externalities. On the other hand, beliefs in 
the competitive advantage of green technologies and a strong record of 
industry-wide compliance help support the development of compliance 
externalities associated with a responsive regulator. 
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1 Introduction 
Environmental protection has increasingly become a major if not controversial area of 
government activity in Latin American countries (Ribeiro and Kruglianskas, 2012). 
While much progress has been made in terms of designing potentially effective policies, 
ensuring reasonable levels of compliance with regulatory requirements is a difficult 
challenge particularly in decentralised systems with diverse enforcement practices, 
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expectations and social beliefs about the importance of environmental degradation 
(Vazquez and Liston-Heyes, 2008; Blackman, 2012;Ribeiro and Kruglianskas, 2012). 
This is particularly so in Argentina where local officials have much scope to interpret 
institutional guidelines and rules as they see fit. For this reason, there are wide 
discrepancies between regulatory intent and actual enforcement outcomes within regions, 
provinces, and municipalities (Vazquez-Brust et al., 2012). 
We argue that such discrepancies hamper the deterrence ability of regulations. If 
firms do not understand or believe that regulators are able (or willing) to ‘respond’ in a 
systematic and consistent manner to environmental infringements, enforcement will be 
more costly and chaotic. The purpose of this study is to investigate perceptions of 
regulatory responsiveness amongst Argentinean firms. Identifying and understanding the 
factors that explain differences in perceptions help us derive policy implications that can 
improve the deterrence function of a regulatory authority. 
Argentina amended its constitution in 1994 (after substantial international economic 
pressures) to provide people of Argentina with a right to a healthy environment 
(Constitucion Argentina, 1994). In defining this right, it adopted the international 
definition of sustainable development – i.e., that the country’s resource use and 
conservation activities should satisfy present needs without compromising those of future 
generation (Nolon, 1996). Similar environmental reforms can be found throughout  
Latin America and there are no doubts that they have exerted some profound influences 
on the environment and on attitudes towards the environment (Blackman, 2012; Ribeiro 
and Kruglianskas, 2012; Fossgard-Mosser et al., 2012). 
Yet, there is strong evidence that the implementation and impact of environmental 
policies on local environments have varied greatly by Latin American nation as a result 
of different political, institutional, economic, environmental, and social conditions 
(Vazquez-Brust et al., 2012). Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Uruguay, for 
instance, have emphasised a regulatory approach based on command and control 
instruments (Fossgard-Mosser et al., 2012). However, Colombia (Blackman and 
Guerrero, 2012) and Brazil (Ribeiro and Kruglianskas, 2012) have also experimented 
with government-supported voluntary programmes in specific regions. In turn, Peru and 
Mexico have incrementally managed environmental issues through auto-regulatory 
instruments based on trust and reciprocity between industry and government  
(Peña-Vinces and Delgado-Márquez, 2013; Vazquez-Brust et al., 2012). 
In the case of Argentina, the country is still struggling – two decades after its 
commitment to provide a healthy environment – to enforce a national strategy for 
sustainable development. Overlapping jurisdictions and a long history of tensions 
between federal, provincial and municipal governments makes enforcement difficult and 
rare (Natenzon et al., 2012). Municipal governments, for instance, are still able to 
sidestep provincial and federal regulations by extending pollution ‘credits’ to private 
corporations (Mutti et al., 2012). There is therefore widespread recognition that 
Argentina needs to find the proper balance of authority and responsibility among 
national, provincial and local governments, as well as between the private and public 
sectors if it is to enforce sustainability-related regulations (Natenzon et al., 2012; 
Yakovleva and Vazquez-Brust, 2012). 
Consequently, Argentinean firms have been operating in a climate of regulatory 
ambiguity for some time. In such systems, firms strategically choose their levels of 
environmental care after forming expectations about how the intensity of the scrutiny 
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they face from local enforcement agencies will respond to their own and perhaps others’ 
environmental performance (Heyes and Kapur, 2009). If they expect the enforcement 
response to corporate environmental violations will be weak, they are less likely to 
expand much effort caring for the environment. If however the local enforcement agency 
is perceived as very responsive to firms’ non-compliance, they factor this into their 
decisions and compliance at the local level is likely to improve. In other words, the nature 
of enforcement ‘shapes’ the quality of compliance irrespective of the actual regulations in 
place. 
Various theoretical attempts have been made to explore how enforcement  
regimes can be designed to manage these expectations in a way that improves 
compliance-outcomes (e.g., Eckert and Eckert, 2010; Heyes and Kapur, 2009). From 
these underlying theoretical considerations, we generate six testable hypotheses and 
interrogate them using data gathered from a purposely designed large-scale survey of 
polluting firms in the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
The objective of this paper is to provide insight into expectations about environmental 
enforcement in Argentina – what they are and what influences them – and to interpret the 
results in the context of environmental policy design. More concretely, we explore 
empirically the perception of ‘enforcement spill-overs’ by those who are regulated. Do 
firms in Argentina believe that the intensity of scrutiny to which they will be subject 
depend upon the compliance behaviour of their peers? If so, what characteristics of the 
firm, its managers, the market and the community influence these perceptions? In other 
words, we attempt to empirically assess the compliance externality firms exert on each 
other through changes in the enforcement response. 
The survey approach we take is a very direct one, based on semi-structured interviews 
with environmental managers at a set of regulated firms. Argentina provides an ideal test-
bed for the study of regulatory responsiveness. As we argued enforcement there is 
significantly less-than-complete so assessing how likely infringements by firms are to be 
subject to enforcement action is important. The results that we generate are of specific 
and immediate interest in thinking about the design and development of enforcement 
regimes in that country, but lead to much more portable policy conclusions for  
Latin American and developing countries in general. 
The plan of this paper is as follow. In Section 2, we provide a brief review of the 
empirical and theoretical literature on environmental enforcement. Parallels are drawn to 
the literature on tax evasion. In Section 3, we identify and motivate six hypotheses. In 
Section 4, we detail the survey methodology and other data sources. In Section 5, we 
interrogate the data and use logistic-regression methods to test the hypotheses. The 
results are also discussed in this section. Section 6 concludes and draws out policy 
implications. 
2 Perceptions of enforcement – theoretical and empirical evidence 
The standard model used by economists to think about firm-level compliance decisions is 
that of the ‘rational polluter’. In the crudest version of it the profit-maximising firm is 
assumed to compare the expected benefit – in terms of reductions in future penalties – of 
reducing its infractions, with the additional operating or other costs associated with 
achieving those reductions. In recent years, the stripped-down version of the rational 
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polluter model has been extended and enriched in a number of directions, capturing some 
of the subtleties of the compliance decisions noted by economists and scholars in other 
disciplines. Notwithstanding, the various shortcomings of the rational polluter model, it is 
useful in highlighting that regulated firms take into account the expected financial costs 
and benefits of their compliance decisions. These may not be the only considerations that 
go into determining the care with which firms approach complying with regulatory 
requirements, but there is overwhelming evidence that they are very important ones. 
Heyes (2009) provides a detailed survey of many of these developments. 
Of course, when thinking about compliance-incentives, it is widely-recognised by 
policy practitioners that the regulatory scrutiny to which a firm is subject to will be 
sensitive not just to its current choice but also to past decisions – i.e., its compliance 
choices and record of success, failure and cooperation in previous contacts with the 
regulator (Spence, 2001). Bergman (2003) makes a similar argument in the context of 
Argentinean and Chilean tax-payers decisions to comply or evade tax authorities. More 
concretely, he suggests that the decisions to comply or not depends on a weighed 
calculation of costs and benefits, the weights of which are determined by an iterative 
game between individuals, the authorities and the wider tax environment. The author, 
using existing survey data, provides compelling evidence that audits negatively affect the 
perceptions of the probability of underreporting detection and that recurrent tax amnesties 
accentuate non-compliance behaviour by rewarding violators for non-complying in the 
first place (Bergman, 2003). 
A calculating non-complier (whether polluter or tax-evader) must therefore ask 
himself how a misdeed now may attract not only immediate penalty, but also increase the 
likelihood that future misdeed will be detected and penalised (Harrington, 1988). We can 
think, therefore, of one feature or characteristic of a well-designed enforcement regime as 
encouraging the perception of ‘enforcement responsiveness’ defined in this way. It is also 
important to note that the intensity of scrutiny by enforcers will be sensitive not only to 
the performance or record of the firm itself, but also to the behaviour of other firms in the 
same market or locale. In other words, in making their compliance choices, firms impact 
upon others through a change in enforcement. A responsive regime invariably creates 
such compliance externalities – i.e., interdependence amongst firms that ‘share’ an 
enforcement agency or local regulator. Such externalities have come to be referred to as 
enforcement or regulatory ‘spill-overs’ and have been recognised in empirical work by 
(for example) Decker and Pope (2005) and modelled formally in a paper by Heyes and 
Kapur (2009). 
Spill-overs can substantially enhance the efficacy of regulatory regimes at relatively 
low additional costs, an appealing proposition for Latin American countries with limited 
enforcement resources (Blackman, 2012). Our study empirically documents these  
spill-overs effects in a sample of Argentinean firms and identifies the factors that help 
explain differences in firm perceptions. 
3 Research hypotheses 
The perceptions of the costs and benefits of compliance is subjective and likely to differ 
from firm to firm depending on their respective assessments of markets and other  
non-markets (labour, social and institutional) benefits of compliance. A critical question 
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is how authorities in charge of policy design can enhance perceptions of regulatory 
responsiveness in order to reduce non-compliance. More precisely, what factors about 
firms or the environment in which they operate are likely to determine their perception of 
enforcement spill-overs? 
Let us think first about the possible role of competition. The stylised facts that 
emerged from a review of development studies suggest a positive relationship between 
market concentration and the likelihood of regulatory capture (Dal Bo and Rossi, 2007). 
Capture occurs when the regulator comes under the influence or even control of the 
industry that it is appointed to regulate. In our setting, capture could be expected to work 
in the direction of laxer enforcement and hence low levels of responsiveness and  
spill-overs effects. 
H1 Other things equal, the probability of enforcement spill-overs is lower in 
concentrated markets than in less concentrated ones. 
We also hypothesise that greener industries will work more closely with the regulator to 
promote good compliance. The success of industry self-regulation schemes often relies 
on the ability of the system to impose sanctions on those who shirk or perform below par. 
In such cases, the industry itself may be more than happy to inform and encourage the 
regulator to clamp down on such firms as a ‘punishment’ (Delmas, 2002). We aim to 
develop evidence in favour of this conjecture by testing the following hypothesis: 
H2 Other things equal, the probability of environmental regulation spill-overs is higher 
in industries with high environmental compliance than in industries with low 
environmental compliance. 
It has been recognised that the locality and setting within which a firm operates may have 
a substantial impact upon its compliance performance. In particular, pressure from a  
well-educated local community can generate improved performance. Compelling 
evidence for this has been provided by Pargal and Wheeler (1996) amongst others. 
Communities with low levels of education may give inappropriately low weight to 
pollution simply because they are not aware of the consequences and/or are unable to 
voice their concerns. In particular, poorer communities in Latin America tend to be less 
informed of risks, have limited capabilities to lobby for a better environment and 
generally rate the environment as a lower priority than employment (Dasgupta et al., 
2000). It is therefore to be expected that such communities are unlikely to pressure 
regulators into action through complaints, collective action and other channels  
(Vazquez-Brust et al., 2012). More concretely, we argue that poorer community will be 
unable to provide sufficiently strong pressures and may be overridden in favour of 
corporate interests (Vazquez-Brust and Nava-Fisher, 2012). Hence, community 
vulnerability might be a factor in the creation of compliance externalities as expressed in 
the following hypothesis: 
H3 Other things equal, the probability of environmental spill-overs is higher in less 
vulnerable communities. 
Our next subset of hypotheses tests the relationship between enforcement spill-overs and 
three factors that measure the firm’s (i.e., its managers’) attitude/stance towards the 
environment and environmental regulations. 
The first of these tests the relationship between spill-overs and the extent to which the 
firm adheres to the win-win paradigm of environmental management, i.e., whether 
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environmental improvements can be a source of competitive advantage (Plaza-Ubeda  
et al., 2009; Peña-Vinces and Delgado-Márques, 2013). One channel through which this 
advantage can be derived arises when regulatory response is actively favourable to good 
behaviour (for instance, by reducing the burden of inspections and other administrative 
tasks). We test the conjecture that firms that are optimistic about the competitive benefits 
of green practices will tend to perceive more responsive regulation: 
H4 Other things equal, the probability of environmental spill-overs is higher in firms 
whose managers adhere to the view that ‘green’ practices can generate a competitive 
advantage. 
In a less developed country setting such as Argentina, managers often perceive 
environmental concerns to be transitory, a fad that is likely to subside through time with 
no genuine political or social backing (Berchicci and King, 2007). We conjecture that 
both managers and regulators may be subject to such biases, reducing actual regulatory 
responses and anticipated ones. We attempt to provide evidence in favour of the 
conjecture by testing the following: 
H5 Other things equal, the probability of environmental regulation spill-overs is higher 
in firms that believe in the growing importance of environmental issues than in firms 
who think it is a passing phase. 
Our final hypothesis focuses on firms’ beliefs about the general ability of governments to 
design and implement effective regulatory regimes. Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) 
recognise that regulatory stakeholders can be a powerful influence on the firm’s 
environmental behaviour. There is also evidence that trust, legitimacy and compliance 
with tax and other laws are intrinsically linked, particularly in Latin America (Bergman, 
2003). Firms that are cynical about the power and purpose of government regulations 
may not have faith in their ability to detect and react to the deterioration in compliance 
and performance of other firms. For this reason, firms may not expect a regulatory 
reaction and consequently will not experience enforcement spill-overs. Moreover, general 
optimism about government efficacy may shift norms and social expectations and harness 
pressures from the local community, employees and investor pressures (Lo and Fryxell, 
2005) thereby increasing the likelihood of regulatory response and compliance 
externalities. 
H6 Other things equal, the probability of environmental spill-overs is higher in firms 
where government regulations are construed as effective. 
In addition to these variables, we also include five often used firm characteristics as 
controls including firm size, the environmental impact of its production technology, its 
environmental performance, whether the firm is publicly traded on the stock market and 
whether it exports goods to countries with relatively high environmental standards (i.e., 
Japan, the USA or EU). While there are no empirical studies directly related to 
compliance externalities (spill-overs), our choice of controls was guided by the 
neighbouring literature on compliance choice and firm behaviour. 
Firm size is a common control variable as it captures competitive benefits associated 
with average costs and greater bargaining power. The traditional argument for including 
size in studies of environmental regulation is that pollution control requirements increase 
the scale of operations needed for efficient production and thereby increase the capital 
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required for entry. There is lots of evidence that there are economies of scale in both the 
productive and administrative aspects of compliance with environmental requirements 
(see for instance, Heyes, 2009). Likewise, bigger firms may find compliance and 
environmental performance ‘cheaper’ than smaller firms, and be relatively more  
pro-active in terms of staying ahead of the enforcement game. Big firms also tend to be 
the prime target of militant stakeholders and green activists and are hence more likely to 
be scrutinised than their smaller counterparts (Baron, 2001). If regulators sense that firms 
in a given sector are underperforming, the clamp down is likely to start with the largest 
firms in the sector. 
Whilst the characteristics of enforcement regimes may differ, the over-arching 
objective of the regime should be to implement a centrally determined environmental 
strategy. It is likely to be the case that such policies require regulators to monitor 
carefully sectors or specific firms that use technologies that potentially have a high 
impact on the environment. Such firms may be ‘good’ citizens in an environmental sense 
but the nature of the technology they use is classified as high impact. High impact 
technology firms might also expect regulators to keep specific tabs on their own 
compliance behaviour and that of similar firms. In other words, high impact firms are 
likely to generate higher compliance externalities than other firms and will thus expect a 
prompt regulatory response to changes in the environmental compliance and performance 
of others. In a similar way, the firm’s environmental performance may indicate a sound 
environmental strategy and provide relative protection from the regulator. 
Much has been made in recent years about the compliance discipline that comes with 
being a listed company (e.g., Badrinath and Bolster, 1996). We therefore control for firms 
traded on the stock market since publicly traded firms are subject to more scrutiny from 
investors and other stakeholders. 
A number of scholars have also examined the link between a producer’s  
export-orientation and its adherence to environmental standards. King et al. (2005), 
amongst others, suggests that firms comply and self-regulate to signal their superior 
environmental management in order to overcome information asymmetries that are 
particularly acute when dealing with distant or foreign exchange partners. Similarly 
regulators – as government officers – might be expected to promote and uphold standards 
to protect and foster trade relations. This suggests that the pressure to be environmentally 
pro-active may be greater for exporting firms (Birdsall and Wheeler, 1993). In Argentina, 
products destined to the US, European, or East Asian market typically contain higher 
value added and tend to be subject to higher standards than those sold within  
Latin America (Toulan et al., 1997). We therefore expect compliance externalities  
(spill-overs) to be more prevalent in export-intensive settings with developed countries. 
4 Sources and methods 
We test these hypotheses using an original dataset constructed on the basis of a  
large-scale survey of managers in Argentinean firms. 
The survey was primarily designed to gather information on managers’ perceptions of 
environmental pressures and how these impact on their decisions about the environment. 
Focus groups, pilot testing and training sessions with surveyors were held to explain and 
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fine-tune the survey instrument. The survey took place in Buenos Aires over 3 years, i.e., 
between March 2005 and March 2008.1 
The sample included small, medium and large firms operating in sectors known to use 
processes that (potentially) involve the discharge of polluting substances and wastes in 
water, air and/or soil and use a lot of energy, water, or non-renewable resources (i.e., 
metallurgy, food, drinks, chemicals, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, non-basic metals, 
manufacturing, hospitals, treatment plants, petrol stations). The sample was selected 
using a stratified design technique with industry, size, and geographical location as 
selection parameters.2 A total of 705 firms were contained in the original sample –  
338 questionnaires contained all the responses required to test the hypotheses of this 
study yielding a response rate of 48%. 
The survey is composed of two structured questionnaires (and a financial annex). The 
first questionnaire (‘environmental practices’ – 60 minutes) was delivered and completed 
by the manager in charge of environmental affairs or he/she’s equivalent. It contained 
questions that enabled us to characterise managers’ perceptions of enforcement  
spill-overs. Specifically, we asked managers to tell us what they thought would happen to 
the frequency of inspections at their own firm if other firms increased the environmental 
violations they committed.3 The responses were converted into a dichotomous variable 
that can be interpreted as ‘the firm expects enforcement spill-overs following a 
deterioration in the regulatory compliance of other firms’ (Yes = 1; No = 0). This 
variable, referred to as SPILLOVERS serves as our dependent variable in a binomial 
logistic regression that is used to test the 6 hypotheses presented above. 
The first questionnaire also generates information about industry environmental 
compliance levels (H2) as well as firm characteristics used as control variables (i.e., firm 
size4, technology, environmental performance, whether or not its stock is listed on the 
market and export orientation). 
The second (‘managers’ opinions’ – 20 minutes) is shorter and completed by senior 
managers empowered to take strategic decisions on environmental issues at company 
level. It contains questions about organisational culture and managers’ attitudes and 
opinions including questions regarding manager adherence to the win-win paradigm 
(H4), the importance of environmental issues over the next five years (H5) and the 
efficacy of government regulations (H6). In some cases (small firms), the two 
questionnaires were completed by the same person. More details of the survey are 
presented in Vazquez-Brust (2007). The data on the index of social vulnerability (H3) 
was taken from a municipality-based survey of vulnerable households carried out in 2006 
by the Argentinean Institute of Statistics (INDEC).Each firm in the database was matched 
to the index of social vulnerability corresponding to the municipality where the firm was 
located. 
Data on industrial concentration (H1) was very difficult to access – the Argentinean 
Government does not keep such records. Instead, we hired a consultancy firm who was 
instructed to calculate the number of employees in the eight largest firms for each of the 
industries (3-digit SIC) represented in this survey. These figures were divided by the total 
number of employees in each industry, producing an index of employee concentration, 
which we used as a proxy to market concentration. The caveats of doing so are obvious 
but few alternative measures are available. 
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Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and frequencies of the variables used to test the 
hypotheses. (Translations of the survey questions used to gather this information can be 
obtained upon request.) 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics (n = 338) 
Numerical variables Min Max Mean Std. D. No (%) Yes (%) 
Dependent: environmental 
spill-overs 
0 1 NA NA 195  
(58%) 
143  
(42%) 
H1 – Market concentration 0.00 0.37 0.05 0.06 NA NA 
H2 – High industry 
compliance 
0 1 NA. N.A. 299  
(88.5%) 
39  
(11.5%) 
H3 – Index of vulnerability 9 45 29.43 6.60 NA NA 
H4 – Green competitive 
advantage? 
0 1 NA. NA. 113  
(33.4%) 
225 
(66.6%) 
H5 – Growing importance 
of env. issues? 
0 1 NA. NA. 137  
(40.5%) 
201 
(59.5%) 
H6 – Gov. regulations 
effective? 
1 5 3.27 1.16 NA NA 
Big firm (n > 500)? 0 1 NA. NA. 308  
(91.1%) 
30  
(8.9%) 
Impact of technology 1 3 2.13 0.61 NA NA 
Firm environmental 
performance 
1 4 2.71 0.67 NA NA 
Publicly traded? 0 1 NA. NA. 226  
(66.9%) 
112 
(33.1%) 
Exports to Japan, USA, 
EU? 
0 1 NA. NA. 239  
(70.7%) 
99  
(29.3%) 
5 Results and discussion 
The hypotheses are tested using binary logistic regression analysis, a popular technique to 
estimate the extent to which a set of predictor variables (either categorical or continuous) 
explains changes in a dichotomous dependent variable (yes/no coded 0/1). In this study, 
the dependent variable is ‘SPILLOVERS’ which captures whether the firm is subject to 
environmental performance spill-overs (a ‘success’) or not (a ‘failure’). 
While logistic regressions are a flexible analysis tool (e.g., the predictor variables can 
take any form since no assumptions are made about their distribution), they are sensitive 
to high correlations among the predictor variables (Table 2). Multicollinearity diagnostic 
statistics including the tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) were computed for 
each variable. As Table 3 shows, none of the VIF factors are over the value of 3 which is 
typically used as the cut-off benchmark for multicollinearity (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
1996). 
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Table 2 Correlation matrix 
Pearson correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(H1) Mkt. 
conc. (H3) ISV 
(H6) 
GvtRegs Technology 
Firm 
performance 
(H1) Mkt Conc. 1 –0.087 
(0.053) 
0.051 
(0.258) 
0.055  
(0.219) 
0.008  
(0.870) 
(H3) ISV –0.087 
(0.053) 
1 0.097** 
(0.029) 
0.014  
(0.750) 
–0.052 
(0.250) 
(H6) GvtRegs 0.051 
(0.258) 
0.097** 
(0.029) 
1 –0.011  
(0.810) 
–0.067 
(0.139) 
Technology 0.055 
(0.219) 
0.014 
(0.750) 
–0.11 
(0.810) 
1 108** 
(0.017) 
Firm performance 0.008 
(0.870) 
–0.052 
(0.250) 
–0.067 
(0.139) 
108**  
(0.017) 
1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 3 Dependent variable: environmental behaviour spill-overs 
Variables B S. E. Wald Sig. ExpB 
Collinearity stats. 
Tol. VIF 
Constant 0.003 1.034 0.000 0.998 1.003   
H1 – Market 
concentration 
–7.359 2.170 11.497 0.001** 0.001 0.959 1.043 
H2 – Industry 
compliance 
1.379 0.401 11.818 0.001** 3.970 0.958 1.044 
H3 – Index of 
Vulnerability (ISV) 
–0.141 0.025 32.815 0.000** 0.869 0.926 1.080 
H4 – Comp. Advantage? 1.598 0.293 4.175 0.041** 1.818 0.931 1.074 
H5 – Importance env. 
issues? 
1.185 0.294 16.257 0.000** 3.271 0.936 1.069 
H6 – Govt. regs 
effective? 
0.714 0.131 29.724 0.000** 2.042 0.950 1.053 
Size (Big?) 1.766 0.501 12.415 0.000** 5.848 0.887 1.127 
Technology 0.486 0.233 4.343 0.037** 1.625 0.910 1.099 
Firm env. performance –0.415 0.216 3.686 0.054** .661 0.937 1.067 
Publicly traded? 0.381 0.347 1.201 0.273 1.463 0.916 1.091 
Export US/EU/Japan? 0.589 0.296 3.963 0.047** 1.803 0.966 1.035 
Model summary    
–2 log likelihood 339.923   
Cox & Snell R Square 0.297 Nagelkerke R. Square 0.400 
Percentage successfully 
predicted 
74%   
Chi-square (119.324); Df (11); Sig. (.000) 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Chi-Square (12.606); Df (8); Sig. (.126) 
Notes: **Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); *Coefficient is significant 
at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
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The usual tests were conducted to assess the performance of the model. The goodness of 
fit test (i.e., the Omnibus test of model coefficients) suggests that the independent 
variables are highly predicting membership to the spill-overs – no spill-overs categories. 
The Hosmer and Lemshow statistic indicates that the model prediction do not 
significantly differ from the observed. The Cox & Snell and Nagelkerke are pseudo  
R-square values which provide an indication of the amount of variation in the dependent 
variable explained by the model. The R2 statistics do not measure the goodness of fit of 
the model but indicate how useful the explanatory variables are in predicting the response 
variable and can be referred to as measures of effect size. The value of 0.40 indicates that 
the model is useful in predicting spill-overs. Finally, the classification table suggest that 
the model correctly classifies 74% of cases overall, an improvement over the 54.9% in 
the original predictor-free model. These tests indicate that the model performed 
reasonably well and is useful in explaining the probability of environmental performance 
spill-overs in Argentinean firms located in and around Buenos Aires. 
Moreover, as the Wald and significance tests indicate, all 6 hypotheses are supported 
by the data and only one control variable has a coefficient that is not significant (the 
publicly traded dummy).5 
The coefficient on the proxy for market concentration (H1) is negative at –7.359, 
suggesting that increases in the market power of firms do indeed lead to a decrease in 
enforcement spill-overs. In other words, firms in concentrated market structures are less 
likely to anticipate increases in regulatory stringency following a decrease in the general 
environmental performance of other firms in the sector – there are much weaker 
compliance externalities in concentrated markets. Two major factors (there may be 
others) can explain this result. Firstly, it is possible that firms in concentrated industry are 
more likely to have ‘captured’ their regulators thereby exerting political influence that 
impacts upon policy-making and implementation that facilitates corporate activities. For 
instance, Dal Bo and Rossi (2007) test a simple model for why (Latin American) 
countries where regulators are more easily ‘captured’ are likely to have more inefficient 
utilities. When regulators are more likely to be vulnerable to influence and approve price 
hikes, firm managers do not have incentives to try their best when coordinating and 
supervising the use of production factors. They find that firms (utilities) are more 
inefficient in countries and times displaying higher corruption. According to 
Transparency International, Argentina ranked 109th (out of 180 countries) in its 2008 
Corruption Perceptions Index. Our argument here is that firms operating in concentrated 
industries share many of the characteristics associated with utilities (i.e., market power). 
Our result may be indirectly uncovering a link between market concentration and 
regulatory capture (i.e., lenient regulatory responses).6 Another major factor may be that 
firms in less concentrated industries lack the competitive pressures that are useful in 
propagating best practice and acceptable norms in environmental behaviour (Baron, 
2001). Ceteris paribus, firms in concentrated market structures have fewer incentives to 
innovate, legitimate their behaviours, and stay in touch with recent developments, 
whether regulatory or others. This lack of interest in rival performance may lead firms to 
downplay regulatory threats. 
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On the other hand, (H2) is associated with a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient, implying that firms operating in industries with a strong compliance record 
are more likely to anticipate regulatory responses to environmental performances 
elsewhere. Perhaps in such industries the regulator has established a reputation for 
toughness and/or firms encourage regulatory responses as sanctions that help enforce and 
protect the industry’s reputation (King and Lenox, 2000) Our third hypothesis – that 
firms will experience less spill-overs when located in poorer areas populated by socially 
vulnerable individuals H3 – is supported by the data. This finding lends support to those 
working in the areas of environmental justice, for example, Dasgupta et al. (2000), and 
Vazquez et al. (2012) who argue that firms operating in poorer communities are less 
likely to be pressured by citizens or government officials responding to citizen pressures 
than their counterparts in wealthier settings. These communities are effectively 
marginalised and yet they tend to be the principal victims of environmental degradation. 
The next set of variables (testing hypotheses H4, H5, and H6) focuses on attitudinal 
and belief factors. The coefficient linked to the competitive advantage dummy (H4) is 
significant and positive suggesting that the odds of a firm experiencing spill-overs is 
higher if the firm’s managers adhere to the notion that environmental investments can 
improve the profitability of a firm. As discussed above, one of the ways in which a 
competitive advantage in environmental performance arises is through a belief in the 
responsiveness of regulators. This result suggests that those who believe in the 
competitive advantage potential of environmental performance also think that regulators 
respond to firm behaviour. 
The hypothesis testing whether a belief that those environmental issues will grow in 
importance over the next five years is also supported by the data (H5). Many Argentinean 
managers believe that concerns about the environment will disappear either because they 
are somewhat faddish or because societies will find scientific and other solutions to deal 
with the problem [see the discussion of ‘Prometheans’ in Vazquez and Liston-Heyes 
(2008)]. In our sample, 41% of managers do not think that environmental concerns will 
become more prominent. Such beliefs are associated with an absence of compliance 
externalities – i.e., the environmental concern of politicians lack credibility and firms are 
dismissive about their commitment to monitor and enforce sanctions. 
The coefficient associated with the variable assessing beliefs in the efficacy of 
government regulations (H6) is also positive and significant. This is an interesting result 
as it shows that firms associate efficient regulatory practices with responsive regulators 
and compliance externalities. Within Latin America, Argentineans demonstrate a 
relatively lower level of trust in public institutions and government agencies. For 
instance, Bergman (2003) reports that Chilean taxpayers are generally willing to pay 
more taxes to alleviate poverty than their Argentinean counterparts. The author links this 
difference directly to the divergence of trust and legitimacy public institutions in the two 
countries. 
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As expected, the coefficient on the control variable firm size is also positive and 
statistically significant as is the coefficient on the dummy controlling for high impact 
technologies. Our results also confirmthat a good performance at the firm level weakens 
regulatory spill-overs. The coefficient on the dummy variable capturing whether the firm 
is publicly traded is not significant but the coefficient on the export dummy is positive 
and statistically significant as expected. 
We conclude that while adverse economic conditions and instability may potentially 
reduce compliance with the law (whether in paying taxes, protecting the environment or 
other), there are other important factors at play. To emphasise this point, Bergman (2003) 
explains that Argentina and Chile – during periods of comparable economic growth – 
experienced significantly different success rates in tax collection. While acknowledging 
that economic variables are instrumental in the enforcement function, they emphasis the 
point that tax policies that rely less on regulation and more on self-enforcing compliance 
are likely to be more efficient. Well-designed reforms should capitalise and enhance 
compliance externalities of the type discussed here. 
6 Conclusions 
While ensuring reasonable levels of compliance with environmental regulatory 
requirements is a difficult challenge at the best of time, compliance is particularly poor in 
Argentina. Its enforcement system is decentralised and characterised by diverse 
enforcement practices and expectations. In other words, regulatory responses are 
idiosyncratic as local regulators’ interpretation of their mission is influenced by the 
behaviours and attitudes of managers in charge of the firms under their jurisdiction as 
well as community and industry pressures. This widespread diversity in enforcement 
practices across different local areas creates disparities between actual and perceived 
enforcement amongst local authorities who have much scope to interpret institutional 
guidelines and rules as they see fit. 
Firms typically trade-off the benefits of compliance against the costs of  
non-compliance. When they witness a weak enforcement response following an 
environmental violation, they are subsequently less likely to expand much effort caring 
for the environment. On the other hand, if they observe consistent strong regulatory 
responses to such violations they will adjust their expectations of the costs of compliance 
accordingly and limit future violations. In the first scenario, there are no compliance 
externalities or spill-overs while in the later spill-overs are substantial. We argued that 
well designed environmental policy should endeavour to enhance enforcement spill-overs 
so as to reduce discrepancies between regulatory intent and actual enforcement outcomes. 
This paper reports the results of a large-scale survey specifically designed to collect 
information on the attitudes and perceptions of environmental pressures experienced by 
managers working in a sample of polluting firms located in and around seven 
municipalities in the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. It uses binary logistic 
regression to identify the factors influencing the perceptions of enforcement spill-overs. 
Since expectations of the consequences of not complying are at the heart of a firm’s 
decision to improve its environmental performance, a more detailed understanding of 
enforcement spill-overs can potentially contribute to the design of more effective 
environmental policies. Enhancing the ability of a regulatory system to generate 
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compliance externalities (of the sort discussed here) are an effective way of enforcing 
environmental regulations at a relatively low cost. 
We formulated six hypotheses and identified five further control variables and tested 
them in using our database. Table 4 synthesises the results of this paper. 
Notwithstanding, the many caveats involved in a study of this kind, the results are 
encouraging in that they show how general improvements in the perceived efficacy of 
government authorities, long-term commitments to the environment and improved market 
based mechanisms that provide competitive advantage to green firms are likely to 
improve perceptions of regulatory responsiveness. Enhanced public participation and 
voluntary industry compliance schemes – through their impact on regulator incentives – 
are also likely to accentuate firm perceptions of regulatory spill-overs. We also note that 
responsive regulation may be less effective in concentrated industries where there are 
important risks of regulatory capture. Such cases may warrant less discretionary 
inspection policies. 
Table 4 Results synthesis: determinants of environmental behaviour spill-overs 
Hypotheses Our analysis show the following: 
Market concentration There are weaker compliance externalities in 
concentrated markets. Plausible explanations 
include regulatory capture and lack of 
competitive pressures. (B = –7.359; Sig. = 0.001) 
H1 Other things equal, the probability of 
spill-over effects is lower in 
concentrated markets than in less 
concentrated ones.  
Industry compliance Firms operating in industries with a strong 
compliance record are more likely to face a 
responsive regulator and/or spill-over effects. 
Plausible explanations include regulatory 
reputation for ‘toughness’ and/or compliance 
through industry sanctions. (B = 1.379;  
Sig. = 0.001) 
H2 Other things equal, the probability of 
spill-over effects is higher in 
industries with high environmental 
compliance than in industries with 
low environmental compliance.  
Index of vulnerability Firms will experience less spill-overs effects 
when located in areas populated by socially 
vulnerable individuals. A plausible explanation 
may be that firms operating in poorer 
communities are less likely to be pressured by 
citizens or government officials responding to 
citizen pressures. (B = –0.141; Sig. = 0.000) 
H3 Other things equal, the probability of 
spill-overs effects is higher in less 
vulnerable communities. 
Competitive advantage The odds of a firm experiencing spill-overs 
effects are higher if the firm’s managers believe 
that environmental investments can improve the 
profitability of a firm. One plausible explanation 
is that those who believe in the competitive 
advantage potential of environmental 
performance also think that regulators respond to 
firm behaviour. (B = 1.598; Sig. = 0.041) 
H4 Other things equal, the probability of 
spill-over effects is higher in firms 
whose managers adhere to the view 
that ‘green’ practice can generate a 
competitive advantage. 
Importance of environmental issues Managers who think environmental issues are a 
‘fad’ will be subject to fewer compliance 
externalities. A plausible explanation is that 
politicians lack credibility and firms are 
dismissive about their environmental 
commitment to monitor and enforce sanctions. 
(B = 1.185; Sig. = 0.000) 
H5 Other things equal, the probability of 
spill-overs effects is higher in firms 
that believe in the growing 
importance of environmental issues 
than in firms who think it is a passing 
phase.  
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Table 4 Results synthesis: determinants of environmental behaviour spill-overs (continued) 
Hypotheses Our analysis show the following: 
Are government regulations effective? Firms that perceive regulations as effective are 
more likely to display compliance externalities. 
A likely explanation is that firms associate 
efficient regulatory practices with responsive 
regulators. (B = 0.714; Sig. = 0.000) 
H6 Other things equal, the probability of 
spill-over effects is higher in firms 
where government regulations are 
construed as effective.  
Control variables:  
‘Size of firm’: Positive and significant coefficient indicating that larger firms are more likely to 
anticipate regulatory spill-overs. The literature suggests that larger firms are more likely to be 
targeted by regulators and militant stakeholder groups. 
‘High impact technologies’: Positive and significant coefficient indicating that firms with 
activities that are known to have a high impact on the environment will be more prone to  
spill-over effects. The literature suggests that regulators will monitor such firms more carefully 
and firms anticipate this. 
‘Firm environmental performance’: Positive and significant coefficient indicating that a good 
environmental performance at the firm level weakens spill-over effects. The literature suggests 
that firms with high compliance records may rely on absolute rather than relative standards of 
behaviour. 
‘Publicly traded’: The coefficient is not statistically significant. Few firms are publicly traded in 
Argentina. 
‘Exports to USA, Europe or Japan’: Positive and significant coefficient indicating that exporters 
are more prone to compliance externalities. The literature suggests that openness encourages 
cleaner industry through the importation of developed-country pollution standards. 
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Notes 
1 The Ministry of Public Works and the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) in Argentina 
supported the delivery, administration and collection of the survey. Linkages to these two 
institutions facilitated access and enhanced participation and goodwill from managers. The 
municipalities provided access to restricted databases as well as fees and stipends for the 
surveyors operating in their jurisdictions. 
2 Firms were first stratified under the SIC Revision three classification and, subsequently, by 
plant size as measured by number of employees (small, medium, large). Within these strata, 
firms were ranked by their level of environmental impact as measured by the NCA or ‘level of 
environmental complexity’ which ranges between 20 and 80. For details of the sampling 
method see Vazquez-Brust (2007). 
3 The exact question (translated from Spanish) is: ‘What do you expect to happen to the number 
of inspections at your firm if other firms increased the frequency of their regulatory 
violations.’ 
4 Number of employees was used as a proxy of firm size. Unfortunately, in Argentina taxes are 
levied according to the number of employees at the firm. This increases the occurrence of  
non-response items and introduces a risk of under-reporting. In the absence of an alternative, 
we used the more general categories (small, medium, large) to improve the reliability of this 
variable. 
5 Few companies are traded in Argentina. In our particular sample, 13% of firms are traded – 
this is much higher than the economy-wide figure of 0.08%. As of 2007, only 100 companies 
listed their shares in the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange – 45 are contained in our sample. 
6 According to Bergman (2003) Chile was much more willing and able than Argentina in its 
political capacity to neutralise rent seeking and predatory pressures. In Chile, it is almost 
impossible to bribe auditors but in Argentina, taxpayers doubt the ability of auditors in 
detecting evasion and realise that bribes are a credible alternative if detection occurs. Our 
findings suggest that a similar story emerges in other areas of enforcement. 
